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This paper expands on the research of competition within the airline industry. This analysis 
estimates the fare-impact of new full-service or low-cost competition in city-pair markets in the 
domestic United States. Given the comprehensive restructuring of the airline industry as a result 
of the Delta-Northwest, United-Continental, and American-US Airways mergers, this analysis 
examines how the fare-impact of competition may have changed since the pre-merger era. This 
paper suggests evidence of a weaker effect regarding the entry of a low-cost carrier and a stronger 
effect regarding the entry of a legacy carrier in the post-merger era relative to the pre-merger 
period. The results support the hypothesis of convergence between the two business models. 
 
Introduction 
The airline industry is arguably one of the most 
competitive industries in the world. Third-party 
flight-searching websites aggregate data from almost 
every carrier, providing what economists refer to as 
‘perfect information’ for consumers. The cost of 
flying is a relatively expensive bulk purchase for 
most consumers. As a result, airlines are incredibly 
price competitive to ensure that price-sensitive 
leisure customers choose their airline and not a 
competitor’s. 
Over the past fifteen years, the airline industry in the 
United States has dramatically changed. The Great 
Recession pummeled airlines’ profits as consumers 
dropped travel and flight plans to save money. The 
significant financial struggles and bankruptcies in 
the industry prompted a series of mergers, with only 
three major legacy carriers remaining - American 
Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines. These 
three airlines, all carriers with full-service business 
models, have been relatively profitable since their 
mergers. However, they are not alone in the skies. 
Low-cost carriers (LCCs) like Southwest, JetBlue, 
and Spirit, have grown in both route network and 
market share across the United States during the 
same time period. 
As a result of the changing market structures, the 
effect of competition on fares may have changed as 
well. This research revisits the fare impact of low-
cost competition in the post-recession, post-merger 
era. Unlike previous analyses, this study will 
investigate how what is commonly referred to as the 
‘Southwest Effect’ has changed over time rather than 
during one period. 
 
Literature Review 
Low-cost carriers operate a significantly different 
business model compared to the full-service legacy 
carriers. In his book, The Economics of Airlines, 
Volodymyr Bilotkach (2017) outlines the general 
cost structures of the legacy and low-cost business 
models. It is important to examine the different 
business models in order understand how 
competition from LCCs has a different impact on 
fares compared to competition from full-service 
carriers. 
First and foremost, low-cost carriers often have one 
type of plane model (allowing for different 
variations) across their fleet. For example, Southwest 
only operates Boeing 737s, but operates the 737-7 
and the 737-8 models (the only major difference 
between the two being the length of the airplane). 
This streamlines maintenance and fleet management 
costs. Subsequently, it reduces pilot and crew 
training expenses. 
Additionally, low-cost carriers tend to operate 
outside of the large, popular airports (Bilotkach, 
2017). These airports tend to be slot controlled, and 
thus have incredibly high take-off and landing fees 




charged by the airport. This is why, for example, 
Ryanair (a major European low-cost carrier) does not 
operate out of London Heathrow, the largest of the 
six airports serving London. Rather, it operates out 
of London Stansted, a significantly less busy airport 
where its bargaining power over take-off and landing 
fee negotiations is much higher. Ryanair is a 
particular expert in this cost-savings method - often 
times they are the sole airline serving some airports. 
In fact, Ryanair not only gets to use some airport 
infrastructures for free, but has sometimes been able 
to negotiate payments from airports (Bilotkach, 
2017). In this rare situation, Ryanair has been able to 
turn the cost-of-business to a revenue stream. 
Moreover, by using smaller, less congested airports, 
LCCs are able to manage quick turnaround times, as 
individual aircraft do not need to waste time in line 
for the runway, in a holding pattern waiting to land, 
or in the airport’s taxiways waiting for the right-of-
way in front of other airlines. This ensures maximum 
fleet utilization by allowing the planes to be in the 
air, making as many revenue-flights as possible in 
one day (Bilotkach, 2017). At some of these smaller 
airports, low-cost carriers do not necessarily use the 
expensive bridges that allow a seamless boarding and 
deplaning process, although this process is much less 
common in the United States than in Europe. For 
example, EasyJet often buses passengers from the 
airport to their tarmac-parked with a staircase offered 
for boarding. 
Most famously, low-cost carriers have cut costs 
relating to passenger services. This includes in-flight 
meals, complimentary drinks, free checked-in and 
carry-on bags, in-flight entertainment, seats with 
reclining ability, extra legroom, and priority 
boarding. Low-cost carriers charge additional add-on 
fees for some of these services. These are important 
revenue-streams for LCCs and have turned into a 
method of price discrimination between passengers. 
As an upside, passengers of low-cost carriers often 
do not need to deal with connections. This is because 
LCCs operate a point-to-point based route network, 
allowing passengers to simply board from city A and 
arrive at city B in one direct flight (Bilotkach, 2017). 
By operating outside of the hub-and-spoke model, 
where legacy carriers fly their passengers into a 
national or regional hub and reshuffle them to board 
a connecting flight to another destination, low-cost 
carriers find significant savings. First, low-cost 
carriers do not need to worry about connecting 
passenger’s luggage (Bilotkach, 2017). More 
importantly, the lack of need to make checked-in 
luggage change planes significantly reduces the 
likelihood that luggage will be lost. Thus, low-cost 
carriers can save on costs regarding reconnecting lost 
luggage with frustrated passengers. 
Through these methods, LCCs are able to drastically 
cut costs. In October 2015, the three large legacy 
carriers: American, Delta, and United, had costs per 
available seat mile (CASM) of 14.25, 14.96, and 
14.87 cents respectively. Compare this to the low-
cost carriers Southwest, JetBlue, and Frontier, whose 
CASMs were 11.16, 10.57, and 8.57 cents 
respectively. Most notably, Spirit Airlines was able 
to reduce its CASM to 7.64 cents, almost half of that 
of the legacy carriers (Bilokatch, 2017). Low-cost 
carriers have mastered cost-cutting tactics. These 
cost savings are often transferred to consumers 
through drastically lower fares compared to the full-
service carriers.  
Alves & Barbot (2009) argue that LCC’s add-on 
revenue tactics to make their models profitable, even 
when they charge below-market fares. They note that 
LCCs charge for different levels of fares by imposing 
‘add-ons’ for features such as carry-on and check-in 
bags, priority boarding, in-flight meals, non-middle 
seats, and extra leg room. This allows the airline to 
price discriminate against consumers and charge 
each costumer their willingness to pay for an extra-
service. Furthermore, by implementing a Lo-Hi 
strategy (in which LCCs charge low prices very, very 
early before departure date and slowly increase the 
fare as the flight approaches), LCCs are able to 
further price discriminate against leisure passengers 




and business passengers. This enables them to profit 
off of the time-inflexibility of quickly booked 
business trips. In fact, with multiple consumers 
having varying probabilities of flying, this Hi-Low 
strategy is the dominant strategy for LCCs (Alves & 
Barbot, 2009). 
Comparing the pre-recession era to the post-
recession era, low-cost carriers have changed 
business practices and gained considerable success. 
According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
(2016), the share of passengers carried by the larger 
network carries declined from 62.0 percent to 50.2 
percent between 2003 and 2015. Atallah et. al (2018) 
finds that low-cost carriers have grown in terms of 
the share of markets they are competing in. Atallah 
discovers that between 2005 and 2015, the share of 
markets in which legacy carriers are the sole 
operators declined by approximately 10 percent. 
Subsequently, the share of markets with only LCC 
carriers provide service increased about 6 percent, 
whilst the share of markets where LCCs joined 
legacy carriers in service competition rose by 4 
percent (Atallah 2018). They also note that pre-
recession, LCCs were tended to enter new, 
previously unserved markets. By entering markets 
with fewer competitors, low-cost carriers gained 
monopoly power and were thus able to exploit their 
status as price makers, leveraging higher profits. 
However, post-recession, LCCs sought to challenge 
legacy carriers in markets where the major carriers 
had dominance. 
Despite the challenging trends that legacy carriers 
face, Atallah (2018) notes that whilst LCCs are 
making inroads in terms of the share of markets they 
serve, they are not gaining flight shares in the 
markets in which they already compete. In terms of 
flight frequency (whether an airline operates one 
flight between the two cities per week, per day, or 
even multiple flights per day), LCCs have been 
losing market share. Atallah points to slot-controlled 
airports - as low-cost carriers begin serving new 
airports, the demand for those slots increase, thus 
driving up the price of valuable take-off and landing 
opportunities. Given their business model, low-cost 
carriers can only purchase one slot for the sake of 
competition, but increasing their frequency raises 
costs and potentially oversaturates the market, 
reducing load factors. 
One of the most interesting subsections of airline 
literature examines how the business models of full-
service and low-cost carriers are changing. Azadian 
& Vasigh (2019) argue that from 2000 to 2016, the 
business models of legacy carriers and low-cost 
carriers showed significant potential for 
‘converging.’ They cite the fact that airline costs 
were seemingly steady between 2005 and 2008 
during a period of rising fuel costs. The authors state 
that “the legacy airlines [moved] toward LCC 
business practices” during the period, referring to the 
series of mergers and cost-controlling measures 
encouraged by the Great Recession. Similarly, they 
argue that Southwest adopted practices resembling 
that of legacy airlines by increasing their connecting 
itineraries. If this were true, then the legacy airlines 
will have an easier time competing against low-cost 
carriers. In terms of the results of this analysis, 
business model convergence would be shown as a 
weaker effect of LCC entrance into a market in the 
post-recession era compared to the pre-recession era. 
Ferrer-Rosella & Coender (2017) also find that the 
difference between the business models is closing. 
They suggest that in terms of expenditure allocation 
from travelers, the two business models are 
converging. They find that on average, passengers on 
legacy airlines were spending a closer share of 
expenses on transportation to low-cost carriers in 
2014 compared to 2006. In other words, passengers 
traveling on low-cost airlines and full-service 
airlines spent the similar share of their budget on 
flight expenses in 2014. This implies that from a 
passenger cost perspective, low-cost airlines and 
legacy airlines are beginning to offer similarly priced 
fares. This can only be profitable (and therefore 




possible) through similar cost structures, indicating a 
convergence between the two business models. 
The fare impact of low-cost carriers entering route 
markets has been thoroughly researched. Dresner et. 
al. (1996) analyzes the entry of low-cost carriers in 
markets between the first quarter of 1991 and the first 
quarter of 1994. He finds that the presence of any 
low-cost carrier reduces fares between 38 and 53 
percent. However, he finds that the first low-cost 
carrier on average will reduce between fares by 4 
percent and 8 percent, whilst the presence of two 
low-cost carriers will reduce fares between 26.9 and 
30.5 percent. Additional analysis is completed for the 
presence of up to five or more low-cost carriers on 
the top 200 city-pair markets. Furthermore, the 
authors find that a low-cost carrier’s presence is 
important even on ‘competing routes’, sometimes 
referred to as adjacent routes. An adjacent route is a 
route between two cities (for example, suppose 
Cincinnati and Washington DC), but by two different 
airports within one of the cities (CVG - DCA vs CVG 
- IAD). Analysis of adjacent routes is common, as 
consumers in multi-airport cities face airlines 
competing against each other, and even sometimes 
against themselves, with services within and between 
that city’s airports. 
Brueckner et. al. (2013) performed similar analyses 
for both nonstop and connecting service using DB1B 
data (Department of Transportation, Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics) between the third quarter 
of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009. 
Brueckner takes the interesting step of measuring the 
number of competitors with multiple variables - one 
variable representing when there are two or more 
legacy carriers offering nonstop routes, and another 
variable with three or more nonstop competitors, etc. 
This is a unique method of differentiating the effect 
of the entrance of the first competitor from a second 
competitor. This is in regard to the hypothesis that a 
second carrier entering a market will have a different 
effect than the third carrier entering the market (a 
hypothesis that fails to be rejected, according to the 
results of their models). Furthermore, their study 
focuses on the impact of Southwest and ‘other’ 
LCCs, in terms of both connecting and nonstop 
services entries. In their weighted market model, 
they find that the first legacy carrier with nonstop 
competition reduced fares by 4.3 percent, nonstop 
competition from Southwest suggests a 26.4 percent 
drop in fares, whilst other nonstop LCC competition 
reduces fares by 16.7 percent. Brueckner states that 
compared to the four quarters of 2000, competition 
from other legacy carriers has had a diminished 
effect. They believe this to be a result of three trends: 
(1) growth of LCCs venturing into new markets, (2) 
greater price information from third party airline 
search tools (i.e Orbitz, Kayak, Google Flights), and 
(3) changes in corporate buying patterns (more 
stringent corporate travel policies).  
Kerry Tan (2016) also uses the DB1B database, but 
uses a much broader time period than Brueckner et. 
al. (2013), opting for the seventeen-year period from 
the first quarter of 1993 through the last quarter of 
2009. Tan performs a time-series regression estimate 
for each ‘incumbent’ airline on a route. Legacy 
carrier incumbents reduced fares by an average of 
14.7 percent in the quarter immediately following 
actual entry, relative to the fare of that carrier-market 
combo in the nine-to-twelve quarters before entry 
range. Notably, the author suggests that Southwest 
Airlines has the largest negative impact on fares 
when entering a market, following with the argument 
that other low-cost carriers may be ‘enhancing’ their 
effect on incumbent prices by dramatically 
expanding their route network and prominence in the 
airline industry. Overall, Tan concludes that what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Southwest Effect’ is 
applicable to other low-cost carriers as well (namely, 
AirTran Airways, which merged into Southwest after 
Tan’s publication, JetBlue Airways, and Spirit 
Airlines). 
Kwoka et. al. (2016) analyzes the route-carrier-
quarter level with DB1B Data from the third quarter 
of 2009 through the second quarter of 2010 (notably, 




the four quarters right after the Brueckner et. al. 
(2013) study). Kwoka et. al’s analysis suggests a 
13.8 percent drop in fares in competition from a 
legacy carrier, but nearly double the effect (26.8 
percent) in reduction when there is competition from 
a low-cost carrier. Notably, compared to the 




Competition between airlines is incredibly 
competitive. This is because the concept of ‘perfect 
information’ is fulfilled, as a result of websites like 
Orbitz, Kayak, and Google Flights that aggregate 
price information and ticket amenities that make it 
easy to compare products between airlines. 
Furthermore, the service offered by firms is nearly 
identical (quick transport from one city to another 
through the air), though there is room for some 
differentiation through add-ons and quality. 
The effect of entry from a competitor can be 
described through simple supply-and-demand 
analysis. As another carrier enters the market, the 
incumbent carriers in monopoly markets lose their 
status as price-makers. The former-monopoly airline 
must then reduce its prices in order to attract 
consumers (this is proved through a simple game 
theory analysis). The entering airline does the same - 
offer low prices in order to gain market share and 
profit with full planes rather than empty ones. This 
property applies in all markets, regardless of how 
many incumbent carriers exist - as more airlines 
compete on the same route, each competitor will 
reduce prices in order to attract more consumers, thus 
increasing revenue and remaining profitable. 
One area where carriers can differ in their service is 
through their route network. Consider the route 
market between LaGuardia (LGA) in New York City 
and PHX in Phoenix, Arizona. Airlines may offer 
nonstop service between the two, which is the most 
desirable product for consumers (as it is the quickest 
option). Subsequently, it may also be the most 
desirable option for carriers, as it reduces the costs of 
baggage transfers and potential lost luggage. 
However, some carriers may choose to compete on 
that route by offering connecting service. For 
example, United Airlines may fly passengers from 
LGA to their hub in Chicago at ORD, and then relay 
passengers to PHX. This allows United to offer fuller 
planes (increased load factors), as not all passengers 
on the LGA-ORD segment of the flight will end up 
in PHX, but may go to Seattle (SEA) or San 
Francisco (SFO). Offering connecting service allows 
airlines to earn more revenue, and thus may be able 
to offer lower prices whilst still maintaining 
profitability.  
How does theory tell us how carriers offering 
nonstop service would react to competition from 
connecting service? It is difficult to say. Connecting 
carriers may be able to charge lower prices given 
their increased load factors. Thus, it would be 
obvious for the carrier offering nonstop service to 
reduce its fares in order to maintain market share and 
attract consumers. However, connecting service is 
often coupled with the hassle of long layovers, 
missed connections, and lost luggage - a lower 
quality service in the eyes of consumers. Therefore, 
nonstop carriers may not have such an incentive to 
reduce fares because they are offering a better 
product. Theory offers no definitive fare effect from 
competition from connecting service - the 
incumbent’s reaction is ambiguous. 
Another type of competition is adjacent competition 
from other airports that serve the same market. 
Continuing with the LGA-PHX example, suppose an 
airline begins nonstop service from JFK to PHX. 
Since LGA and JFK both serve New York City, 
nonstop competition from another airport serving the 
same market might be treated the same as if the latter 
carrier began service from LGA to PHX. For this 
reason, markets in this paper are not in terms of 
airport-pairs, but rather city-pairs. 




In all of these, the magnitude of the effect may be 
dependent on the business model of both the 
incumbent and entering competitor. Low-cost 
carriers, as described earlier, undertake a significant 
array of cost-cutting tactics. These savings are passed 
along to consumers in the form of fares drastically 
lower than what some full-service carriers can offer. 
Therefore, when incumbents are full-service legacy 
carriers and face competition from entering low-cost 
carriers, they face significantly lower prices on the 
market. These low fares will attract rational 
consumers. As a result, legacy carriers will 
drastically reduce the airfares they offer in order to 
best compete against low-cost carriers. However, it 
is important to note that some consumers are not 
entirely price sensitive. In cutting costs, LCCs reduce 
flight service to the bare bones, often making it an 
uncomfortable and unenjoyable experience to fly. 
Low-cost carriers are only able to offer low fares by 
offering a lower-quality product. Theory may argue 
that the incumbent’s reaction will be ambiguous. 
However, literature has often found that prices are 
the dominant factor in consumer’s airline decision, 
thus giving low-cost carriers the edge in terms of 
competition. Thus, full-service carriers are forced to 
reduce fares significantly more when facing 
competition from low-cost carriers. 
Economic theory may also be useful in hinting at 
how the fare effects of competition have changed 
given the change in the structure of the industry. 
Since there are fewer legacy airlines, it can be 
inferred that each are more likely to enjoy monopoly 
power on some routes (although the hub-and-spoke 
route network structure make connecting-service 
competition much easier and common). Therefore, 
the effect of the first competitor in the post-merger 
era may be larger compared to the pre-merger era 
given the possible increase in monopoly power.  
The convergence of the business models of full-
service and low-cost carriers may also bring some 
note-worthy theoretical insights. While this would 
not necessarily have a major impact on full-service 
to full-service competition (as both are able to match 
each other’s lower prices with cost savings of their 
own), the magnitude of fare reduction caused by 
competition from low-cost carriers may not be as big 
as it once was. This is because low-cost carriers are 
taking on higher costs by offering service as larger, 
more expensive airports and offering connecting 
service. Furthermore, full-service carriers are 
actively engaging in techniques adopted by low-cost 
carriers. Therefore, full-service carriers can offer 
lower fares that are able to compete with low-cost 
carriers whilst remaining profitable. As a result, low-
cost carriers are slowly beginning to look like full-
service carriers, and the inverse is true as well. At full 
convergence, the business model of an airline would 
no longer play an effect on the magnitude of reaction 
from incumbent carriers. In other words, we would 
expect to see the effect of competition from the first 
legacy and low-cost carrier to be closer in the post-
merger era as a result of the converging business 
models. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data Sample 
This study uses data from the US Department of 
Transportation’s Passenger Origin-Destination 
Survey, otherwise known as the DB1B database. It is 
a 10 percent sample of all US-domestic flight 
itineraries sold from reporting carriers (all major 
American airlines and their regional affiliates are 
included within this). DB1B data is public and 
released quarterly. Given that the first major merger 
between Northwest and Delta commenced in 2008 
and the most recent major merger between US 
Airways and America Airlines finished October 
2015, this study examines flights in two three-year 
periods: from the first quarter of 2005 to the last 
quarter of 2007, and the first quarter of 2016 through 
the last quarter of 2018. 
Of this comprehensive data sample, a smaller 
subsample was used for modelling. First and 




foremost, only economy-cabin, roundtrip itineraries 
were included for the study (after other filters 
mentioned below, 98.15 percent of all itinerary 
tickets within the sample were roundtrip). This 
contrasts the Brueckner study, where one-ways were 
included and roundtrip fares were divided in half to 
represent the fare of a one-way segment. This paper 
does not include that process. Airlines offer special 
discounts to roundtrip fares that cannot be obtained 
with the aggregation of two one-way fares. For the 
same reason, multi-city fares were also dropped, as 
they are simply the collection of multiple one-way 
fares with no discount. Additionally, all ‘open-jaw’ 
itineraries where a roundtrip passenger does not 
return to their city-of-origin are dropped. Thus, the 
remaining subsample is the set of roundtrip 
itineraries that were in a simple outbound-and-return 
form. It should be noted that any flight segment with 
layovers is not necessarily excluded from this 
subsample as long as the origin and destination cities 
are reached in a continuous stretch of flights. 
Nonstop and connecting itineraries are included. For 
an itinerary to count as nonstop, both the outbound 
and the return tickets must have only one coupon, 
indicating there is one flight and thus no layovers 
between the origin and destination cities. Any flight 
that has two or more coupons (indicating at least one 
layover) on either it’s outbound, return, or both of its 
flights will be marked as a connecting itinerary. 
Itineraries with multiple ticketing carriers are also 
dropped (for example, an itinerary where the 
passenger purchases a ticket with Delta on the 
outbound leg and United on the return leg is 
dropped). This is because it is likely that the trip was 
sold as two one-way fares from each airline though a 
third-party seller (Orbitz, Expedia, etc.). However, 
this does not necessarily mean that itineraries with 
multiple operating carriers are dropped. To mark the 
difference: the ticketing carrier is the airline that sells 
the ticket to the passenger, but is not necessarily the 
airline that operates that flight. The operating carrier 
is the airline whose plane and resources are used to 
transport passengers. It is common for an itinerary to 
have one ticketing carrier, but multiple or different 
operating carriers through codeshares, joint ventures, 
interline agreements, or regional affiliations. For 
example, American Airlines may operate one 
segment through their own brand, but then another 
segment with Republic Airways (an operator of the 
American Eagle brand). Any itineraries that include 
multiple ticketing carriers are dropped as explained 
above, but this does not mean that itineraries with 
multiple operating carriers are dropped as well. 
It should be noted that any regional affiliates were 
‘grouped’ into their mainline carrier, i.e. any operator 
that works with United Airlines to serve under the 
United Express brand such as SkyWest, GoJet, and 
ExpressJet was renamed in the data to be United as 
long as the ticketing carrier was also United. 
In terms of outlier fares, all fares less than $25 were 
dropped, similar to a step taken by Brueckner et. al. 
(2013) and Tan (2016). Additionally, fares five times 
larger than the median fare for that route on that 
quarter. Bulk fares were dropped, given their 
generally higher fares. Finally, the DB1B database 
provides an indicator whether the dollar fare amount 
is credible. Any remaining itineraries with in-
credible fare values were excluded. 
To help isolate causality and induce a ‘base’ fare for 
comparison, all routes included in the sample must 
have had at least one legacy carrier flying in at least 
one quarter throughout the time period. It should be 
noted that 97.15 percent of all tickets in the final 
subsample were on routes that had legacy carrier 
service on all twenty-four quarters of the two time 
periods. 
Population and income data are retrieved from the 









The model in this paper is built in consideration with 
previous models, mainly Brueckner, Lee and 
Singer’s (2013). 
Airlines counted as full-service carriers include: 
American Airlines (AA), Delta Airlines (DL), 
United Airlines (UA), Alaska Airlines (AS), 
Hawaiian Airlines (HA), Northwest Airlines (NW), 
US Airways (US), and Continental Airlines (CO). 
Airlines considered to be low-cost carriers include 
Southwest Airlines (WN), JetBlue Airways (B6), 
Spirit Airlines (NK), Allegiant Airlines (G4), 
Frontier Airlines (F9), Sun Country Airlines (SY), 
Virgin America (VX), and Air Tran Airlines (FL). 
As stated in the theoretical analysis section, cities, 
rather than airports, serve as the basis for 
determining markets in this model. This means that 
any flight from JFK to DEN would be considered in 
the same market as EWR to DEN, as the DB1B 
Database ‘city market id’ variable classifies that both 
JFK and EWR serve the same city/metropolitan area. 
Furthermore, the directionality of the round-trip 
studies is disregarded. For example, an itinerary from 
New York to Seattle would be counted under the 
same “city-pair” market as an itinerary from Seattle 
to New York. 
Each observation in the DB1B database was 
aggregated and averaged, using passenger-weights, 
to the market-quarter level. This means that the fare 
of each observation in the final dataset is the 
weighted average of all nonstop and connecting fares 
between two cities in either direction. 
Given the panel data, a fixed-effects regression was 
used. The ‘individual’ for the regression was the city-
pair. The use of a fixed-effects regression allowed 
the model to capture time- and market-invariant 
effects of each route. 
Four variables were used to build the ‘base’ fare. 
Ideally, the resulting fare from these four variables 
would create the fare in the monopoly market. In the 
model, these variables are the population, income, 
passengers, and distance variables. The population 
variable is the geometric mean of the populations of 
both endpoints on the route. Similarly, the income 
variable is the geometric mean of the per-capita 
incomes of the cities on both sides of the route. The 
distance variable is the minimum distance flown 
between two cities on any of the tickets. This is the 
closest way of determining the actual distance 
between two cities without needing another data set. 
It should be noted that although this was calculated 
as the minimum distance flown between two cities, 
it is the same for both nonstop and connecting flights. 
Finally, the passengers variable is generated as the 
number of passengers that flew on the route during 
that quarter. This variable is the only one of the four 
that is expected to be negative - more passengers 
flying on the route means fuller planes, thus allowing 
carriers to reduce fares. 
The competition variables are set up to determine 
incremental effect of additional competition relative 
to one legacy carrier. In other words, the model 
assumes that all markets are set up originally with 
one legacy carrier operating nonstop service between 
the two cities. There is a unique competition variable 
for each business model’s nonstop service that 
determines the incremental effect of its entry into the 
market. For example, consider legacy_nonstop3. 
This coefficient on this dummy variable will 
demonstrate the effect of a third full-service carrier 
entering the route. This is because the effect of the 
first carrier’s entry is shown by setting up the fare 
through the income, population, distance, and 
passenger variables. The effect of the second 
carrier’s entry is already shown by the 
legacy_nonstop2 variable. Thus, the incremental 
effect of the third full-service carrier entering the 
market is described by legacy_nonstop3. 
In the construction of the connecting variables, the 
same rule applied: equals one if a carrier is offering 
connecting service on a route and equals zero if a 




carrier is not offering connecting service on that 
market during a quarter. However, since connecting 
service is a ‘lesser quality’ product compared to 
nonstop service, any carrier offering nonstop and 
connecting service on a route is only counted once as 
providing a nonstop service. Thus, if three carriers 
offer nonstop service on a market, one of which 
offers connecting service, whilst two other carriers 
offer connecting service and not nonstop service, the 
model sees three nonstop carriers and two connecting 
carriers. This is a similar step taken in the Brueckner 
et. al. (2013) study. 
There are a few assumptions that should be noted. 
First, there are multiple dummy variables showing 
the incremental effect rather than one continuous 
variable with the number of carriers because the 
impact of a third carrier assumed to not be equal to 
that of a second carrier’s entry. Secondly, since there 
are less than 1,000 route-quarter observations where 
a legacy_nonstop4 variable would equal one on a 
dataset of more than 275,000 route-quarter 
observations, the effect of any carrier after the third 
is assumed to be the same as the third carrier’s entry. 




The general equation for the fixed effects regression is as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑒)  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)  +  𝛽2(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)  + 𝛽4(𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠) 
+ 𝛽5,6,7(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑠)  +  𝛽8,9,10,11(𝐿𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)  +  𝛽12(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) 
+ 𝛽13,14,15(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑠)  +  𝛽16,17,18,19(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗  𝐿𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠) 
+ 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿𝑗  +  𝑖,𝑗 
 
*The overall model is weighted by the total number of passengers traveled on the route during the two time periods - busier routes are 
thus weighted more strongly and have higher influence on determining the coefficients. 
Data Diagnostics 
The diagnostics in Table 2 below represent the means 
and standard deviations of each of the variables from 
the final data set filtered as described in the 
methodology section. 
One of the most interesting results of the diagnostics 
came from a variable excluded for comparison: 
legacy_nonstop1, a dummy variable that equals one 
when there is any legacy carrier offering nonstop 
service on that route. Although the variable is not 
included in Table 2 since it is not in the regression, it 
is worth noting because of interest. According to the 
data, 88.82 percent of all route-quarters did not have 
at least one legacy carrier offering nonstop service 
(the route-quarter could have had connecting legacy 
carrier service). However, when weighting each 
route-quarter by passengers, approximately 78.63 
percent of all passengers flew on route-quarter 
combinations where a legacy carrier did offer 
nonstop service. This shows the importance of 









Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Ln(Fare) The natural log of the passenger-weighted average fare of each market 
Income (1000s) The geometric mean of the yearly per capita incomes of the connected cities 
Population (100,000s) The geometric mean of the yearly populations of the connected cities 
Distance (100s) The minimum distance ever flown between two cities (roughly similar to the 
geographic distance between two cities) 
Passengers (100s) The sum of all passengers flying nonstop or connecting service between the two 
cities 
Legacy_nonstop2 Dummy variable, equals 0 if there is only one nonstop legacy carrier on the 
route, equals 1 if there are two or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service. 
Legacy_nonstop3 Dummy variable, equals 0 if there is are two or less nonstop legacy carrier on 
the route, equals 1 if there are three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop 
service. 
Legacy_connect1 Dummy variable, equals 0 if there are no connecting legacy carriers on the 
route, equals 1 if there is at least one legacy carriers offering connecting service. 
LCC_nonstop1 Dummy variable, equals 0 if there are no nonstop low-cost carriers on the route, 
equals 1 if there is one or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service. 
LCC_nonstop2 Dummy variable, equals 0 if there are no nonstop low-cost carriers on the route, 
equals 1 if there are two or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service. 
LCC_nonstop3 Dummy variable, equals 0 if there are no nonstop low-cost carriers on the route, 
equals 1 if there are three or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service. 
LCC_connect1 Dummy variable, equals 0 if there are no connecting low-cost carriers on the 
route, equals 1 if there is one or more legacy carriers offering nonstop service. 
Post Dummy variable, equals 0 if the observation is in the pre-merger era (2005 - 

















Unweighted, Route-Quarter Level 
 
n = 275,281 
Weighted by Passengers in each 
Quarter 
 
n = 98,103,962 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev 
Ln(Fare) 5.887 0.383 5.520 0.409 
Income (1000s) 41.716 8.520 49.432 10.490 
Population (100,000s) 9.619 9.487 41.389 29.169 
Distance (100s) 18.160 11.615 12.268 7.457 
Passengers (100s) 3.564 18.221 96.729 129.989 
Legacy_nonstop2 0.034 0.181 0.522 0.500 
Legacy_nonstop3 0.009 0.096 0.277 0.448 
Legacy_connect1 0.965 0.183 0.859 0.348 
LCC_nonstop1 0.080 0.272 0.750 0.433 
LCC_nonstop2 0.019 0.136 0.389 0.488 
LCC_nonstop3 0.005 0.068 0.166 0.372 
LCC_connect1 0.153 0.360 0.468 0.499 
Post 0.448 0.497 0.498 0.500 
Post*Legacy_nonstop2 0.172 0.130 0.262 0.440 
Post*Legacy_nonstop3 0.009 0.096 0.131 0.337 
Post*Legacy_connect1 0.437 0.496 0.390 0.488 
Post*LCC_nonstop1 0.046 0.210 0.396 0.489 
Post*LCC_nonstop1 0.015 0.120 0.261 0.439 
Post*LCC_nonstop3 0.004 0.062 0.118 0.322 
Post*LCC_connect1 0.074 0.262 0.215 0.411 
 
 






Table 3: Fixed-Effects Regression Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Income (1000s) 0.0022085*** 1.03e-06 
Population (100,000s) - 0.0018858*** 1.73e-06 
Distance (100s) 0.0015392*** 1.99e-06 
Passengers (100s) - 0.0014013*** 1.66e-07 
Legacy_nonstop2 - 0.003251*** 0.0000139 
Legacy_nonstop3 - 0.0359914*** 0.0000139 
Legacy_connect1 0.0111292*** 0.0000248 
LCC_nonstop1 - 0.1462011*** 0.0000145 
LCC_nonstop2 - 0.0399968*** 0.0000148 
LCC_nonstop3 - 0.0110259*** 0.0000211 
LCC_connect1 - 0.0306448*** 0.0000109 
Post - 0.4485369*** 0.000317 
Post*Legacy_nonstop2 - 0.0334525*** 0.0000164 
Post*Legacy_nonstop3 - 0.029655*** 0.0000229 
Post*Legacy_connect1 - 0.0571541*** 0.0000273 
Post*LCC_nonstop1 0.0145194*** 0.000017 
Post*LCC_nonstop1 - 0.0918607*** 0.0000185 
Post*LCC_nonstop3 - 0.0466627*** 0.0000239 
Post*LCC_connect1 0.0229644*** 0.0000129 
Intercept 6.034493*** 0.0000846 










From the regression, we see have multiple inferences 
from the data. Notably, all coefficient estimations 
have a p-value less than 0.01. This means that there 
is a 0.1 percent change of a Type I Error, giving us 
99.9 percent confidence in the estimation of our 
coefficients. It should be noted that this first model 
assumes no heteroskedasticity, but a regression with 
robust standard error is performed later, resulting in 
some coefficient estimations losing their statistical 
significance. 
First, we shall discuss the four regressors that are 
constant across the pre-merger and post-merger era. 
The coefficient of the income variable is 0.0022, 
suggesting that for every additional one thousand 
dollars (since the data is in terms of thousands of 
dollars) of the geometric mean of per capita income 
between the two cities, the airfare on that city-pair 
market will increase by 0.22 percent. This is perhaps 
backed by economic theory, specifically the law of 
demand. As incomes rise, consumers will make more 
purchases, with airline tickets being amongst those 
purchases. Demand for air travel increases, thus 
increasing the fare. 
The coefficient of the population variable is -
0.00189, which infers that for every one-hundred 
thousand person increase in the geometric mean of 
the populations between the two cities, average 
airfare will decrease by 0.12 percent. Economically 
speaking, this is difficult to back up by theory. 
However, it may make sense in the following 
mechanism: larger populations may boost demand to 
the point where flight frequencies increase. This 
creates competition within a carrier to fill more 
planes, and thus requires the airline to decrease fares 
to incentivize more travelers to buy tickets. 
The coefficient on distance is 0.00154. This suggests 
that for every additional one hundred miles between 
cities, airfare increases on average by 0.15 percent. 
This makes sense: farther distances increase fuel 
costs for airlines, who must then raise prices to 
compensate. 
The coefficient for passengers is approximately -
0.0014. This implies that for every additional one 
thousand passengers flying on that route market, the 
average airfare decreases by 0.14 percent. This defies 
economic theory, which states that the more 
consumers there are in a market, the more prices 
there are. However, this may be correlated with the 
number of carriers serving a market, and thus may be 
‘absorbing’ some of the effect of competition, as 
more passengers often requires more carriers. 
The competition variables will be discussed broadly, 
rather than individually. In the pre-merger era, 
nonstop competition from legacy carriers had a small 
reduction on incumbent fares. Whilst nonstop 
competition is negative, it is surprising that 
competition from a legacy carrier offering 
connecting competition has a positive coefficient - 
suggesting that connecting competition increases 
incumbents’ fares. This is perhaps because 
connecting service is ‘worse’ compared to nonstop 
service. Therefore, carriers offering nonstop service 
can ‘raise’ fares, as the alternative to their travel 
product is superior to any competitor. 
In the post-merger era, we can imply from the 
negativity of the interaction terms that the reduction 
of incumbent fares in the pre-merger era is enhanced 
in the post-merger era. This is true for both nonstop 
and connecting competition. The enhanced effect 
suggests that competition from legacy carriers is 
more intense in the post-merger era relative to the 
pre-merger era.  
Theoretically, this may be the result of a multitude of 
mechanisms. The first is the expansion of third-party 
fare aggregation companies, like Orbitz, Kayak, and 
Google Flights. Websites like these allow consumers 
to compare flight prices more easily, thus increasing 
the incentive for airlines to reduce prices relative to 
their competitors. Additionally, this may be due to 




the convergence of the airline business models as 
argued by Ferrer-Rosella and Coender (2017). Since 
legacy carriers are engaging in cost-cutting tactics, 
they are slowly beginning to resemble low-cost 
carriers. Therefore, it would make sense that the 
effect of these pseudo-low-cost-carriers have the 
competitive effect closer to low-cost carriers than 
before. 
In the pre-merger era, low-cost carriers have 
significant reduction in fares - the entry of the first 
low-cost carrier reduces fares by 14.6 percent. This 
makes economic theoretical sense, as low-cost 
carriers can have reduced cost structures and can 
therefore offer lower fares that attract consumers. In 
the post-merger era, the first entry of a first low-cost 
carrier is actually reduced to about 13.2 percent. 
However, entry from the additional low-cost carriers 
offering nonstop service is enhanced in the post-
merger era due to the negativity of the coefficients. 
This may be because low-cost carriers expanded 
their market share (in terms of domestic passengers 
carried) over the years, and thus have more 
brand/name recognition. Brand/name recognition is 
important to airlines, as consumers are more likely to 
trust and fly with a brand they had flown with before 
or heard or (consider a consumer’s general 
knowledge on Delta or Southwest Airlines, 
compared to their familiarity with Allegiant or Sun 
Country Airlines). This is perhaps evidenced by 
Brueckner et. al. (2013), where Southwest (arguably 
the most widely known low-cost carrier in the United 
States) has a larger reduction in fares compared to 
other low-cost airlines. 
The impact of connecting fares are also interesting in 
the post-merger era. In the pre-merger era, 
competition from legacy connecting carriers actually 
increased incumbents’ fares, whereas competition 
from low-cost connecting carriers reduced 
incumbents’ fares by approximately three percent. 
This may indicate that although connecting service is 
largely more of a hassle, and thus lesser quality, low-
cost carriers are still able to offer deeper discounts 
that consumers would be willing to fly connecting on 
a low-cost carrier than nonstop on any other carrier. 
In the post-merger era, however, competition from 
legacy carriers’ connecting service turns negative, 
decreasing fares by approximately 4.6 percent. 
Conversely, competition from connecting low-cost 
carriers has a reduced effect, reducing incumbents’ 
fares by less than one percent. Theoretically, this 
may be backed by the convergence of the low-cost 
carrier and full-service business models. 
One notable coefficient is the estimation on the 
dummy variable that indicates which fares are in the 
post-merger era. The coefficient is 0.4485, which 
suggests that fares, on average, are almost 45 percent 
lower in 2016 - 2018 relative to the 2005 - 2007 time 
period. Whilst this seems surprising at first, there 
could be some explanation for this. First, perhaps the 
significant cost-cutting tactics and debundling of 
amenities engaged in by legacy carriers led to the 
fruition of lower fares (though this may also be 
reduced quality with the transfer of amenities from 
being part of the fare to being expensive add-on 
fees). Second, aircraft are increasing their fuel 
efficiency (such as the Airbus A320neo series and 
Boeing 737 MAX series, along with the few 
domestic flights that use the Boeing 787), thus 
reducing fuel costs. 
 
Regression Diagnostics 
The regression underwent a series of tests to generate 
statistics that will help determine how well the model 
fits the data. Other tests help determine whether or 
not econometric assumptions are met. 
The fixed effects regression comes with three R2 
values, each of which determine which how well the 
results of the regression (the coefficients) explain the 
variation in the observed fares. A value of one means 
that the regression can explain one hundred percent 
of the variation in the fares. The overall- R2 value is 
0.5224, implying that the regression can explain 




52.24 percent of the variation in all of the observed 
fares of the final data set. The within- R2 value is 
relatively high, at 0.8452, suggesting that on average, 
84.52 percent of the variation in observed fares 
within each city-pair market can be explained by the 
regression. Conversely, however, the between-R-
squared value is 0.4366, implying that on average, 
the regression can explain 43.66 percent of the 
variation in fares between routes during the same 
time quarter. Although this R-Squared value does not 
satisfy a test, it is useful in determining how well the 
model predicts reality. 
One of the first classical assumptions requires that 
there be no correlation between the independent 
variables (a condition referred to as 
multicollinearity). To diagnose this, a correlation 
matrix of the coefficients of the regression were 
used. Between the continuous variables, the absolute 
value of the highest correlation value is 0.1029, 
which was between passengers and the geometric 
mean of the income. This makes sense, as cities with 
higher incomes are likely to generate more 
passengers. However, this is a relatively small 
correlation. Between the dummy variables, there was 
relatively high correlation between the individual 
competition variables (for example: the normal 
legacy_nonstop2 had a high correlation with the 
interaction of post*legacy_nonstop2). This is 
expected, however, as carriers do not change service 
frequently, especially if the route is profitable. 
The distribution and expected values of the residuals 
is also important to note. Both the skewness and the 
kurtosis of the residuals are both equal to 0.0000, 
suggesting that the residuals of the regression are 
distributed normally. A normal distribution for the 
residuals allows for hypothesis testing. Additionally, 
the mean of the residuals is -0.00129. Arguably, this 
is relatively close to zero, and thus enough to satisfy 
the econometric assumption that the expected value 
of the residuals is zero. 
Heteroskedasticity is the relationship between the 
residuals and the regressors. Heteroskedasticity was 
assumed, therefore another regression is run with 
robust standard errors. The results are seen in Table 
4 below. Most notably, many of the competition 
variables lost their statistical significance and were 
accompanied by an increase in their standard errors.  
In testing for correlation, the above table should also 
be referred to. The robust standard errors in the fixed 
effects regression corrects the standard errors not 
only for heteroskedasticity, but also autocorrelation. 
Thus, we can assume that there is minimal 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
regression results under the robust standard error. 
Finally, an F-Test was performed to see how well the 
general model is. The F-Test score is 0.0000 for both 
that non-robust and robust standard, suggesting that 
the model less than a 0.01 percent chance of a Type 
I Error. This implies that the model and the collection 
of variables used is statistically significant. It should 
be noted that this analysis meets several limitations. 
The first is that the data was restricted to include only 
round-trip fares, and therefore the estimated fare 
reductions cannot be applied to one-way tickets or 
multi-city itineraries. Additionally, since the DB1B 
database only contains data on domestic routes 
within the United States, this analysis cannot extend 
to international routes. Subsequently, the results are 
not applicable to how low-cost airlines outside the 
United States such as Ryanair and EasyJet affect 
competition due to the difference in airline-









Table 4: Regression Estimates Under Robust Standard Error 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Income (1000s) 0.0022085** 0.007411 
Population (100,000s) - 0.0018858 0.0017486 
Distance (100s) 0.0015392 0.0011129 
Passengers (100s) - 0.0014013*** 0.0002576 
Legacy_nonstop2 - 0.003251 0.0077309 
Legacy_nonstop3 - 0.0359914*** 0.0102552 
Legacy_connect1 0.0111292 0.0230676 
LCC_nonstop1 - 0.1462011*** 0.0107458 
LCC_nonstop2 - 0.0399968** 0.0123103 
LCC_nonstop3 - 0.0110259 0.0157679 
LCC_connect1 - 0.0306448*** 0.0084524 
Post - 0.4485369*** 0.0290979 
Post*Legacy_nonstop2 - 0.0334525* 0.0128098 
Post*Legacy_nonstop3 - 0.029655 0.0200282 
Post*Legacy_connect1 - 0.0571541** 0.0268102 
Post*LCC_nonstop1 0.0145194 0.0106495 
Post*LCC_nonstop1 - 0.0918607*** 0.0155988 
Post*LCC_nonstop3 - 0.0466627** 0.0193367 
Post*LCC_connect1 0.0229644** 0.0095442 
Intercept 6.034493*** 0.0722969 











This paper examined how competition in the airline 
industry has changed since the pre-merger era. This 
research performed with the Passenger Origin and 
Destination Survey data investigated how different 
business models, different service types (nonstop or 
connecting), and different incremental entrances 
have different effects on incumbent’s fares. 
This paper finds that nonstop competition in the post-
merger era is more competitive between legacy 
carriers and post-secondary low-cost carriers, but 
less so for the first low-cost carrier entering a market. 
Connecting competition from either has a relatively 
small impact on nonstop fares, though the overall 
effect in the post-merger era turns negative. Low-
cost carriers still have a significantly larger impact 
on nonstop competition compared to legacy carriers, 
although the gap between the two impacts on 
incumbent fares is closing.  
The timing of the COVID-19 outbreak and economic 
downturns associated with it may gain some insight 
from this paper’s findings. The Great Recession 
caused a series of mergers between some of the 
largest airlines, and with one of the sharpest 
suspensions in air transport service ever seen in 
history, the airline industry may be due for another 
series of acquisitions. These findings may offer a 
glimpse of how competition will change over the 
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